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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000348

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TAGS: [NATO](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PREF](#)  
SUBJECT: NATO SYG MEETS RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ROGOZIN  
  
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Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

11. (U) This is an Action Request. See paragraph 8.

12. (C) Summary: On August 11, 2009, new NATO Secretary General Rasmussen held his first meeting with Russia's Ambassador Rogozin, following Rasmussen's announcement that improving NATO-Russia relations is one of his three priorities as Secretary General. Rasmussen reported to Allies that the meeting was "overall very positive" and that the two discussed the future of the NRC, Russian support for Afghanistan, and the NATO Strategic Concept. Rogozin provided Rasmussen with a non-paper on NATO-Russia cooperation, the text of which is provided below. Unless otherwise directed, USNATO will express concern about the lack of any mention of the territorial integrity of Georgia in the discussion between Rasmussen and Rogozin, as well as point out our reservations about several of the suggestions in Russia's non-paper. End summary.

Rasmussen's Meeting with Rogozin  
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13. (C) During their first bilateral meeting on August 11, NATO SYG Rasmussen and Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin discussed the future of the NATO-Russia relationship a year after the Georgia-Russia War. Rasmussen stressed his desire to strengthen NATO-Russia cooperation and added that the NRC had not reached its full potential as an efficient, results-oriented body. Rogozin said he wanted to work on the "Taking the NRC Forward" draft in preparation for the NATO December Ministerial and stressed that he did not/not want to eliminate any existing NRC groups, but rather reform those that were not working or were dormant. Rogozin indicated that Russian FM Lavrov wanted to meet Rasmussen on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York and that Russia wanted Rasmussen to visit Moscow shortly thereafter. Rogozin also proposed a meeting in the near future between NATO International Staff and members of the Russian Mission to NATO to discuss specific aspects of NATO-Russia cooperation.

14. (C) In Afghanistan, Rogozin said that Russia wanted to intensify its assistance by creating a special working group on Afghanistan in the NRC and by enlarging the NRC Counter-Narcotics training project to focus on drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Rogozin also suggested an NRC Ambassadorial meeting on Afghanistan/Pakistan to which all delegations could bring experts. Rasmussen agreed that the

NRC Ambassadorial meeting could be useful, but did not respond specifically to Rogozin's other proposals.

15. (C) Regarding the Strategic Concept, Rogozin said Russia was eager to contribute to its formation and would suggest an NRC Ambassadorial meeting with the Chairman of the relevant committees in the Russian and Allied Parliaments to discuss its content. Rasmussen replied that he was committed to making the process of drafting the Strategic Concept a transparent one and commented that Russian suggestions would be welcome. Rasmussen noted that Rogozin had participated in former SYG de Hoop Scheffer's Strategic Concept seminar on July 7th.

16. (C) To conclude the meeting, Rasmussen stressed that NATO wanted to improve the NRC to face common security challenges like terrorism, piracy, and non-proliferation. At the same time, he added NATO is dedicated to certain principles, including its Article 10 commitment to enlargement and the right of any state to choose its own security alliances. Rasmussen also expressed concern about recent proposals in the Russian Duma authorizing military deployments abroad in defense of Russian interests, noting that Allies see this as a threat to their security. Rogozin said the legislation was merely "symbolic" and was meant to make more precise the procedures for a power that always existed. After the meeting with Rogozin, Rasmussen requested to speak with the PermReps about NATO-Russia relations and the way ahead at a lunch before the next NRC in Ambassadorial format.

17. (C) Comment: We find it troubling that Rasmussen did not expressly reiterate NATO's position supporting Georgian territorial integrity. The agreement we brokered which allowed for re-engagement with Russia emphasized the importance of speaking frankly with Moscow on areas where we disagree. NATO's Article 10 is important, but it is not the

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issue here. What is at issue is Russia's failure to live up to its commitments in numerous international agreements, such as the Helsinki Final Act, affirming the principle of territorial integrity. This principle is also enshrined in the founding documents of the NATO-Russia relationship. As a result, we would have hoped that Rasmussen would have set out a clear marker that the Alliance expects Russia to live up to its commitments.

#### Post's Concerns About the Russian Non-Paper

18. (C) Action Request and Comment: Rogozin provided Rasmussen with a non-paper on the future of the NATO-Russia relationship (the text of which is provided below in paragraph 9). While some suggestions in the Russian non-paper are unobjectionable, several are problematic. Unless otherwise directed, Post will express the following:

- 1. Post supports the continuing work of improving the NRC and the "Taking the NRC Forward" paper. Post will stress that several committees of the NRC are ineffective and/or unnecessary and we should not simply return to an NRC structure that has been proven not to work. Resetting the relationship also means we need to reset the structure of the NRC.
- 2. While we do not object to Rasmussen meeting with Russian FM Lavrov on the margins of UNGA in September, Post feels strongly that Rasmussen should visit each Ally before visiting Moscow. A visit to the Baltic states prior to a Moscow trip will be particularly important if we are to manage the Alliance through our reengagement with Russia. Post also believes that, rather than continually sending NATO representatives to Russia, Russia should consider sending high-level visitors to Brussels, like all other Ally and Partner nations, if improving NATO-Russia relations is a sincere goal.
- 3. Post believes the proposed meetings between NATO International Staff and members of the Russian delegation are ill-advised. The work of reforming the NRC must be done

among all 29 NRC countries, not by Russia and the support staff of the Alliance.

--4. Post agrees that Afghanistan is a common security challenge to both Russia and NATO and a key area where our interests coincide.

--The use of flexible formats to hold meetings with the Central Asian states and Afghanistan has proven effective precisely because Russia is not in the room. In the full EAPC, these states rarely talk, largely because they defer to Russia. While it may from time-to-time make sense to include Russia on certain topics, we would recommend against changing the usual nature of these meetings.

--Post remains opposed to the inclusion of Russia in the ISAF contributors forum. Currently, NATO meets with Non-NATO Troop Contributor Nations (NNTCNs). Expanding this forum to include nations not serving in country would undermine the effectiveness of the discussion and mean that sensitive subjects could not be discussed.

--Post does not object, in principle, to enlarging the NRC counter-narcotics training project, but needs more details to fully assess the proposal.

--Post objects to any contact or "exchange of experience" between NATO and CSTO.

--5. Post does not object to enhancing the public diplomacy of the NRC and, in particular, making the NRC website more interactive and informative. In this context, as in all others, Post will ask about cost-sharing with Russia. Post does not object to a meeting among the directors of MFA Disarmament Departments of the NRC member states, provided an agenda is agreed upon beforehand.

--6. Post objects to the suggestion that the Georgia-Russia war "showcased the fragile and imperfect existing security architecture in Europe" and instead views the war as the violation by Russia of Georgia's territorial sovereignty. Post had understood that discussion of Russia's proposed European Security Treaty initiative had already occurred, but nonetheless believes that any future discussion of it should occur within the framework of the OSCE, not NATO.

--7. Post agrees that the NATO Group of Experts should visit Moscow and has no objection to transparent Russian input into the drafting of the Strategic Concept through the avenues available to all NATO partners. The Group of Experts also should visit other partner countries.

--8. Post does not object to finalizing the MOU between Russia and NAMSA.

--9. Post agrees that better NATO-Russia mil-to-mil cooperation is beneficial, but objects to the proposed

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meetings between Rogozin and SACEUR and SAC-T. Post, however, would not object to Russia sending appropriate high-level military representatives to meet with SACEUR and SAC-T. End Action Request and Comment.

Text of the Russian Non-Paper

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19. (C) The text of the Russian non-paper is below:

"1. The NRC should be an all-weather body and work in spite of existing disagreements. Thus we deem it important to continue work on taking the NRC forward and put forward proposals on the basis of the consolidated paper, to be approved at the next NRC ministerial.

12. We are ready to intensify our political contacts. Foreign Minister Lavrov is prepared to discuss NATO-Russia cooperation and a possible visit of the Secretary General to Moscow on the margins of the 64th UN General Assembly in New York.

13. We propose to organize a meeting between the division heads of the International Secretariat and respective staff members of the Russian Mission in order to have working-level discussions of specific aspects of our cooperation and conducting a working review of the state of affairs in our practical interaction. All current NRC projects are a result of the work started several years ago. It's important to broaden the range of our practical cooperation and enhance its capitalization.

After a review of programmes and projects of our cooperation

we are prepared to receive the Assistant Secretary General Erdmann in Moscow during the week of September 28.

¶4. Afghanistan is a common security challenge to both Russia and NATO and a key area where our interests coincide.

-- We find it necessary to create a special working group on Afghanistan in the NRC. It would be a format where we could integrate all projects and issues pertaining to Afghanistan.

-- Russian participation in the ISAF contributors format would enable us to intensify our cooperation on Afghanistan and to be involved in discussing important issues directly affecting our security interests.

-- Engaging Russia in the NATO plus Central Asian states format would also enable to alliance to make use of our experience in the region.

-- It might be time to enlarge the NRC Counter-narcotics training project which could also fulfill the task of halting the precursor traffic to Afghanistan and the drug trafficking out of Afghanistan.

-- We expect the Bucharest transit arrangements to become effective in the nearest future. The Russian authorities are ready for the regular transit of goods for ISAF.

-- The CSTO is an important organization dealing with security issues in the region, particularly in fighting the drug trafficking. Contacts and exchange of experience between NATO and CSTO in solving the security problems of the region could be part of our contribution to assisting Afghanistan.

¶5. Practical cooperation issues.

Enhancing the public diplomacy of the NRC and, in particular, making the NRC website more interactive and informative.

In order not to marginalize the NRC in the arms control and disarmament sphere we insist that a meeting be organized between the directors of MFA Disarmament Departments of the NRC member states.

¶6. The fragile and imperfect existing security architecture in Europe was showcased during the crisis in August 2008. We deem it important to discuss topical issues of the European security in the NRC. Among them is the European Security Treaty initiative which is becoming more substantial by day and which should be discussed in the NRC as well, even while keeping in mind the known role of the OSCE in this process.

¶7. Considering that both NATO and Russia are working on their doctrinal documents right now, it would be useful to coordinate our approaches. Transparency in this process would enable us to minimize the discrepancies in our views. In this light we propose to examine the possibility of organizing a visit to Moscow of the NATO Group of Experts.

¶8. The MOU between the Government of the Russian Federation and NAMSA. We have worked on it for several years now and given a needed impetus, finishing the work on this agreement could make it a real deliverable of our cooperation.

¶9. The mil-to-mil cooperation should be given a new impetus. Meetings between the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO and SACEUR J. Stavridis as well as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Stephane Abrial would be of

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use as well."

DAALDER